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Spain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their ﬁscal behavior using measures of overbor-
rowing and ﬁscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain’s
success in avoiding default. Instead, ﬁscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrow
at below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals. (JEL: E4, F41, N23)
1. Introduction
Debt sustainability matters. Sovereign defaults are often cataclysmic events
involving widespread damage to the ﬁnancial sector, the economy, and the polit-
ical and social fabric of countries in trouble. Assessing what level of debt is
sustainablethereforecarriesspecialimportance.Towardthisend,theInternational
Monetary Fund (IMF) uses a range of methods (IMF 2003). These assessments
can lead to austerity programs involving wrenching ﬁscal adjustments (Stiglitz
2003) both before and after crises.
We analyze two historical cases using the existing metric for debt sustain-
ability. We focus on hegemonic powers of their time, 18th-century Britain and
16th-centurySpain.Bothhadaccesstoadvancedﬁnancialmarketsandnetworks,
and their ﬁnances were under severe pressure as a result of constant warfare. One
countrybecameasynonymforﬁscaldisaster:Spainisarecord-holderfordefault,
reneging 13 times on its debts between 1500 and 1900. Philip II started this tra-
dition, going bankrupt four times during his reign (Braudel 1966). Britain, in
contrast, not only prevailed in early modern power struggles, but also emerged
without defaults and with a widely admired ﬁscal structure.
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We are not the ﬁrst historians to analyze these two cases. Britain is tradition-
ally seen as a paragon of ﬁscal virtue. Scholars have stressed the government’s
willingness to increase ﬁscal pressure as debts escalated during the 18th century
(Brewer 1990). Others have pointed to the United Kingdom’s solid institutions
as the deeper cause of its ability to borrow without any difﬁculty (North and
Weingast 1989). Finally, some scholars have emphasized the deep, liquid ﬁnan-
cial markets that emerged after 1700, a “ﬁnancial revolution” that followed the
Glorious Revolution (Dickson 1967; Ferguson 2002). Spain, on the other hand, is
traditionally seen as being hopelessly overstretched, both ﬁnancially and militar-
ily (Kennedy 1987). Because it was almost continuously at war, its ﬁscal position
is normally described as beyond repair, a view that is apparently conﬁrmed by
the frequency with which Philip II had to reschedule his obligations (Thompson
1994).
We will use two popular measures of debt sustainability to shed additional
light on these apparently polar opposite cases: an indicator of overborrowing, as
used by the IMF (2003), and the Bohn (1998) measure of the ﬁscal response to
accumulatingdebts.Wethenconcludewithsomecommentsonwhatthehistorical
record can teach us about the emergence of sustainable debts.
2. Indebtedness and Surpluses
The IMF recently presented simple estimates of overborrowing, calculated by
taking averages of the primary surplus, interest rates, growth rates, and the debt
stock. The sustainable debt level was then calculated as
D∗ = PS/(r − g),
where D∗ is the sustainable debt level, PS the primary surplus, r the interest rate,
and g the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP). Actual debt levels Dt
are then compared with D∗. The IMF found that industrial countries had debt
levels broadly in line with the long-term sustainable ones. By the same yardstick,
there is evidence that many emerging countries overborrow: the net present value
of their future surpluses is less than the debt stock. Industrial countries have an
overborrowing ratio around 1 (suggesting no overhang), but the ratio for Latin
Americancountriesis2.5,andforthosewithahistoryofdefaults,3.5(IMF2003).
Such high ratios imply that a sharp ﬁscal adjustment is necessary to make debt
burdens bearable. This gives strong analytical support to typical “ﬁscal austerity”
packages, as prescribed by the IMF in numerous recent ﬁnancial crises around
the globe.
We begin by analyzing the Spanish case. We draw on a new, comprehensive
dataset of Spain’s ﬁscal position (Drelichman and Voth 2007). For the main esti-
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de la Escosura (2007).1 For the period as a whole, average debt levels are about
equal to the maximum sustainable debt level, despite constant wars and relatively
high interest rates. The second half of the 16th century saw what historians call
the “price revolution,” with metal imports from the Indies pushing up prices. The
fact that D∗ approaches half of GDP is partly a consequence of this inﬂation,
which boosted nominal GDP and eroded the real value of debt.
The average for the period as a whole hides substantial variation. During the
ﬁnal decade of Philip II’s reign, when debt levels reached 62% of GDP, the rise
in the primary surplus generated a D∗ of 60%. Given these ﬁgures, it is hard to
conclude that Habsburg Spain overborrowed. However, if we use the alternative
GDP estimates compiled by Carreras (2003), then this is not so clear. Because
of lower growth, debt levels now exceed the sustainability threshold by more
than 10%.
In contrast, Britain appears to have overborrowed in terms of the IMF mea-
sure. Its debt level was 10 percentage points higher than could comfortably be
serviced,despitelowinterestrates.Theperiodestimatemaskssharpswingsofthe
primary balance from surplus in peacetime to deﬁcit in wartime. Although many
authors have stressed the rise of the tax state in 18th-century Britain, the primary
surpluses generated are not impressive compared to those of Philip II. Moreover,
Philip’s surpluses were all generated during war years; Britain was borrowing to
cover interest expenses when at war. If there is one factor that allowed Britain to
accumulatelargerdebts,andtooutspenditscontinentalrival,itwaslowerinterest
rates. Had Britain had to face the same interest rates as Philip II, it would have
beenabletoborrownot85%,butonly22%ofGDP,farlessthanHabsburgSpain.
Given that Philip II defaulted four times during his reign, part of the difference
in the interest rates may reﬂect this risk. We return to this issue subsequently.
Modern-day evidence suggests that highly variable government revenues
limit the amount of debt a state can take on (IMF 2003). Britain failed not only
to pursue particularly stringent ﬁscal policies, but also to stabilize its revenues.
BothBritainandSpainsufferedrelativelywideswingsintaxrevenues,withcoef-
ﬁcientsofvariationaround0.12and0.18.Moderneconomieshavearangeof0.02
to 0.2, with a median of 0.07. Yet while Philip II could compensate the volatile
silverrevenuesfromtheIndieswiththeextremestabilityoffarmedrevenuesfrom
Castile, Britain’s tax system eschewed the use of farming altogether. This is seen
by many historians as a sign of ﬁscal virtue, but it left Britain with revenues that
were hardly more stable than those of Spain two centuries earlier.
The evidence presented so far may seem surprising. Britain, the nation tradi-
tionally seen as a paragon of ﬁscal virtue in the historical literature on sustainable
sovereigndebt,appearsnobetter—ifnotworse—thanthestandardvillaininmost
1. We use their lower-bound estimates of silver currency per capita incomes, combined with
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Table 1. Standard indicators of debt sustainability.
DD ∗ PS r g
Spain, 1560–1598
Main estimate 42 40 2.4 0.09 0.03
Alternative GDP 47 36 2.8 0.09 0.012
Britain, 1698–1794
Main estimate 85 74 1.65 0.035 0.0138
War years 83 −1.12
Peace years 87 189 4.2 0.035 0.0138
Sources: Bonney (2007), Drelichman and Voth (2007).
histories of default. Tax pressure was not markedly higher in Britain. Revenue
relative to GDP stood at 8.7% relative to GDP, compared to between 7.3% and
7.6%forSpain.Attheirpeak,bothSpainandBritainweregeneratingrevenuesto
the tune of 11% of GDP. Standard indicators of ﬁscal rectitude, such as primary
surpluses and debt levels, seem to be of little help in understanding the contrast-
ing experiences of Britain and Spain. Given the evidence in Table 1, how can we
explain why Spain, and not Britain, became the most frequent serial defaulter in
history?
3. Fiscal Policy Functions
Traditional debt sustainability analysis attempts to predict whether debt-to-GDP
ratios will stabilize or rise in the future, given current policies and a range of
possible alternatives. Because we do not know with any degree of precision what
asustainablelevelofdebtforacountryis,thisapproachoftenleadstoconclusions
that are much too optimistic (Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry 2007). One alternative
is based on ﬁscal policy rules that ensure sustainability. For example, as Bohn
(1998) showed, if the primary surplus increases strongly when debt levels rise,
then the discounted present value of surpluses will never be less than the value of
outstanding debts.
The Bohn approach has recently been applied more widely to contrast good
and bad ﬁscal policies around the globe (IMF 2003). The IMF concluded that
sharp increases of the primary surplus in response to the accumulation of debt is
common in industrial countries, but much less frequent in the developing world.
Typically,alessdevelopedcountry(LDC)willraisetheprimarysurplusfrom0%
to 3% when debt increases from 20% to 50% of GDP and then leave it largely
unchanged. Industrial countries generate higher surpluses throughout, with a 2%
rate when debt is 20% of GDP that increases to around 8% when debt reaches
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Figure 1. Primary surpluses and debt in 16C Spain and 18C Britain.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
How did Britain and Spain react to the accumulation of debt? Spain showed
arelativelystrongresponse(Figure1).Atadebtlevelof20%ofGDP,itsprimary
surplus would be exactly zero, rising to 3.75% when debt reached 50% of GDP.
Although primary surpluses do rise rapidly with the increase in bonds and loans
outstanding,theinterceptisactuallynegative.ThismeansthattheHabsburgkings
started out with low primary surpluses when their debts were low, raising them
to higher levels only when debts grew.
Figure 2 looks at the evolution of Britain’s debts and primary surpluses over
the18thcentury.Primarysurplusesincreasedinabsolutevalueaftereverywar,but
they hardly changed at all relative to GDP. In 1700, Britain had a primary surplus
of 7% of GDP; by 1790 it stood at 7.8%. Given the enormous accumulation of
debts relative to GDP, rising from 28% to 116%, this is surprising. As shown
in Figure 1, there is only a mildly upward-sloping relationship between primary
surpluses and debt levels in Britain. The regression implies that, when debt/GDP
stood at 20%, the typical surplus was 3.3% of GDP and rose to 3.6% when debt
reached 50% of GDP. These values are far below the ones found by the IMF for
developed countries today, and at higher levels of indebtedness they are similar
to values seen in emerging markets today.
In Figure 3, we repeat the analysis for Spain. Although the primary surplus
ﬂuctuates from year to year, it is clearly rising over the period. It peaks at over662 Journal of the European Economic Association
Figure 2. Britain’s debts and primary surpluses, 1698–1794 (shaded areas represent major wars).
Table 2. Fiscal policy reaction functions.
Beta t-statistic adj. R2 N
Spain, 1560–1598
OLS 0.038 1.75 0.09 31
Britain, 1698–1794
OLS −0.06 0.58 0.003 97
War years (OLS) −0.026 2.10 .07 46
Peace years (OLS) 0.013 3.20 .15 51
3% at the end of our sample. The increase parallels the rise in the debt/GDP ratio,
which shows a rise from 25% to over 45%.
Foramoresystematiccomparison,weestimateBohn-styleregressions.Table
2 compares the results for Habsburg Spain and Britain. The Bohn coefﬁcient is
0.038 for the reign of Philip II. It is either negative or small and positive for
Britain. Even if we restrict the analysis to the peace years, the ﬁscal reaction to
accumulatingdebtswasnomorethanathirdasvigorousasin16th-centurySpain.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnancially most successful early modern state,
Britain, showed almost no ﬁscal response to changes in debt levels. Instead, it
maintainedprimarysurplusesatbroadlyconstantlevels,despitetherapidaccumu-
lation of a large national debt. We contrast this experience with the much sharper
Bohn reaction functions found in a much less successful rival, Habsburg Spain.Drelichman and Voth Debt Sustainability in Historical Perspective 663
Figure 3. Spain’s debts and primary surpluses, 1566–1596.
Our results suggest that ﬁscally weak states may not be capable of generating
rapid changes in their surplus and, if they are, success is not assured.
4. The Role of Fiscal Repression
The evidence from ﬁscal policy rules appears to deepen the mystery revealed by
overborrowing ratios. Philip II, well known for his lavish spending and repeated
bankruptcies,showedﬁscalbehaviorthatwashighlyresponsibleaccordingtothe
Bohn approach. The coefﬁcient on debt in the ﬁscal reaction function is larger
than the one for the United States in the 20th century (Bohn 1998), and it was
ten times larger than Britain’s in the 18th century. What is different is the much
lower surplus at low levels of debt. Here, Britain is far above either contemporary
LDCsorindustrialcountries.Britainthereforecombinedonlyaminimalresponse
of the primary surplus with a high degree of ﬁscal conservatism at low levels
of indebtedness. One possible interpretation focuses on the fact that peacetime
broughtreliableprimarysurplusesthatcouldrepaythedebteventually,evenatlow
levelsofdebt.BecauseBritainhadsmalldebtsinitially,thewillingnesstoengineer
primary surpluses and actually reduce debt levels in the early 18th century (in
peacetime) may have created a virtuous cycle: greater commitments led to lower
interest rates, which again made repayments easier in peacetime.664 Journal of the European Economic Association
In contrast, Philip II never built a reputation for prudence based on observ-
able ﬁscal behavior. Interest rates were high and did not decline, making it harder
to hit primary surplus ﬁgures that rendered debts sustainable. The importance of
lowinterestrateshasalreadybeenemphasized.Itisapparentinthefactthat,even
though tax pressure was about the same in Great Britain and Spain, the former
could still accumulate sustainable debts almost twice as large as its continental
rival. The experience of 18th century Britain may suggest a degree of path depen-
dence in debt accumulation and the prospects for repayment. The responsiveness
to accumulating deﬁcits, as measured by the Bohn rule and its variations, could
be secondary if a country uses its “only chance to leave a ﬁrst impression” by
working hard to engineer surpluses at (initially) low levels of government debt.
We favor an alternative interpretation: ﬁnancial repression. British ﬁscal rec-
titude in the early 1700s is an unlikely explanation for the progressively lower
interestrateslaterinthecentury.WhenBritainshowedthemostfavorableratioof
primary surpluses to debt, in the early 18th century, its interest rates were not par-
ticularly low. In real terms, they were as high as those paid by Philip II. It is only
from the 1710s and 1720s onward that British interest rates decline precipitously
(Sussman and Yafeh 2006). Because this places the discontinuity a good quarter
of a century after the Glorious Revolution, it follows that institutional quality
and the restraints imposed by parliamentary rule are also unlikely candidates.
Instead of earning a right to lower interest rates, Britain carefully ensured the
government’s privileged access to citizens’ savings. Interest rates were heavily
regulated. Usury laws reduced the private sector’s competition for funds and cre-
ated artiﬁcially easy borrowing conditions for the government (Temin and Voth
forthcoming). It is no coincidence that government debt service became much
cheaper only after 1714, when usury laws were tightened and private lenders
were not allowed to charge more than 5% per year. Other limitations on private
loan contracts, such as restrictions on their maximum duration, worked in the
same direction. There is ample evidence that government borrowing crowded out
private investment on a large scale. Every time military spending surged, private
borrowers were effectively shut out of the loan market (Williamson 1984; Temin
and Voth 2005).
Simple reﬂections on investor rationality reinforce this point. At its peak in
1822,theBritishgovernmenthadcontractedloansequivalenttonearlythreetimes
GDP (Barro 1987). Whenever the country fought a war, debt surged. It increased
from50%ofGDPaftertheWaroftheSpanishSuccessionto140%aftertheSeven
Years War and to 275% after the Napoleonic Wars. Yet repay Britain eventually
did, while many of the lenders to Philip II saw their claims reduced as part of
the reschedulings. However, it took the long Pax Britannica after 1815 to reduce
debts to negligible levels. For 64 out of 97 years in our historical sample from
the 18th century, Britain’s actual debt level was above the sustainable level, often
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rates of 3% stood a chance of being repaid only if the frequency of war declined
sharply relative to their historical experience. Only then, with Britain using large
peacetime surpluses to pay down its debts, was there a chance of sustainability.
Whether investors could have foreseen peace breaking out with a vengeance in
the 19th century is highly doubtful. That the Pax Britannica did take hold after
1815isnoproofofexanteinvestorrationality.Wesimplydonotknowhowmuch
luck at Trafalgar and Waterloo was necessary to ensure the eventual triumph of
Britain, but few historians would argue that success was a foregone conclusion at
anystage.Thatinvestorspurchasedconsolsmaywelltellusmoreabouttheirlack
of alternatives than about the inherent attractions of U.K. government paper. By
thesametoken,Philip’sbankerscouldnotforeseetheutterruinofhis“Invincible
Armada” (its name was not meant ironically).
Thus, part of the contrast in the experiences of Spain and Britain involves
access to domestic savings. Whereas Britain could squeeze domestic borrowers
and lenders through interest-rate regulations and the like, Philip II had to turn to
German, Genovese, and Portuguese bankers. This reliance on imported capital
limited the extent to which non-market rates could be obtained for borrowing.2 If
our interpretation is correct, then both Hanoverian England and Habsburg Spain
paid their lenders less than they could have expected in a free-market setting.
Whereas Philip periodically chose to reschedule, 18th-century Britain decided to
pay its creditors below-market interest rates. In this sense, Britain secured access
to resources by means other than taxation: by paying investors in government
bonds less than the market rate of return. Although tax pressure was similar in
the two countries, ﬁscal pressure measured comprehensively (including the costs
of ﬁnancial repression) may have been higher in Britain.
5. Conclusions
Ahistoryofdefaultsseemstopredictfuturedefaultstoasubstantialextent,above
and beyond traditional indicators of debt burdens (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savas-
tano2003).Yetwheredoes“debtintolerance”comefrom?Andwhatcanwelearn
from the emergence of ﬁscally successful states in early modern Europe? Many
accounts of how Britain defeated France and Spain on the ﬁnancial battleﬁeld,
and succeeded in its bid for European hegemony, emphasize ﬁscal discipline and
the willingness to increase taxes after each war (Brewer 1990; Bordo and White
1991; Ferguson 2002).
The data presented in this article call this interpretation into question. Judged
by the standards of modern debt sustainability analysis, Britain was not in much
2. The extent to which Britain borrowed abroad is not well established, but it likely did not exceed
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better shape than Habsburg Spain. Its debts relative to its sustainable borrowing
capacity were not particularly low, and the primary surpluses it generated were
notparticularlyhigh.NordidtheBritishgovernmentreactquicklyanddecisively
to rising debt burdens. The crucial factor that made British borrowing sustainable
was a low cost of borrowing.
The markedly lower interest rate faced by the British government was only
partly a result of ﬁnancial discipline and the default-free track record of Britain.
Evenattheinitiallylowlevelsofindebtedness,ithadgeneratedprimarysurpluses.
If path dependence mattered for creditor perceptions, then the strict ﬁnancial dis-
cipline of the early Hanoverian regime may have had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the long-run viability of Britain’s ﬁnances in spite of a war-induced borrowing
binge. We favor an alternative view: early surpluses, the only dimension of tradi-
tionaldebtsustainabilityanalysisinwhichBritainshines,areprobablyirrelevant.
Instead, a deft dose of ﬁnancial repression rendered Britain’s debt position sus-
tainable.Justasthemajorityofindustrialcountriesdidintheperiodbetween1950
and 1975, Britain did not allow the market to set interest rates on its debt. Instead,
a wide range of direct and indirect rules channeled money to the government at
preferential interest rates.
Inthisarticlewehavearguedthattoday’sdevelopingcountriessharemanyof
the same ﬁscal problems that European states faced between 1500 and 1800, and
weexploredthesesimilarities.Ifourargumentissofarcorrect,thenneithertough
ﬁscal policy rules nor the standard rules of prudent indebtedness proved decisive
in avoiding “debt intolerance” in Britain and Spain. Simplistic calculations of
sustainable debt burdens, based on either overborrowing ratios or ﬁscal policy
rules,arenotsufﬁcienttoassesswhetherornotdebtscanbeserviced.Wesuggest
that a previously neglected factor, ﬁnancial repression, was crucial. Given that
European countries and the United States engaged in similar practices as recently
as the 1960s and 1970s (Wyplosz 2001), we question whether freely set interest
rates and free international capital ﬂows are compatible with the emergence of
“debt tolerance” in LDCs today.
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